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I. Introduction 
Have you ever found yourself at a restaurant or a bar, looking 
to quench your thirst with a nice craft beer? If you have, you may 
have had the wait staff recite a lengthy selection of beers, or have 
been confronted with a long list of craft brews, from different 
locations and breweries, each likely represented by a distinct 
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name—a name that is most likely trademarked.1 Often, the 
distinct names of beers and breweries significantly influence the 
consumer about which “cold one” to order.2 Due to the significance 
of branding and marks within the craft beer industry, the survival 
of a brewery relies heavily on its ability to properly protect its 
trademarks.3 This Note will focus on one method of protection—
trademark coexistence agreements that are negotiated between 
two breweries. 
Smaller companies such as craft breweries often decide to 
enter into contractual agreements (referred to as “consent 
agreements” or “coexistence agreements”) with one another in an 
effort to avoid costly litigation over trademarking.4 Generally, 
trademark coexistence agreements are contractual agreements 
allowing “potentially confusing trademarks to coexist in the 
market without trademark infringement lawsuits.”5  
                                                                                                     
 1. See Alastair Bland, Craft Brewers are Running Out of Names, and Into 
Legal Spats, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Jan. 15, 2015, 9:08 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/01/05/369445171/craft-brewers-are-
running-out-of-names-and-into-legal-spats (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) 
(explaining that “[v]irtually every large city, notable landscape feature, creature 
and weather pattern of North America—as well as myriad other words, concepts 
and images—has been snapped up and trademarked as the name of either a 
brewery or a beer”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 2. See Ulrich R. Orth et al., Promoting Brand Benefits: The Role of 
Consumer Psychographics and Lifestyle, 21 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 97, 98 (2004) 
(“Craft beers are such an object with relatively few attributes that physically 
differentiate products, and brand names have been shown to have considerable 
importance in the purchase decision.”).  
 3. See Why It’s Important for Craft Brewers to Register, GERBEN L. FIRM 
PLLC (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.gerbenlaw.com/blog/why-its-important-for-
craft-brewers-to-register-trademarks/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) (“That increasing 
popularity, however, means an increasingly crowded marketplace, and with it, 
more competition for trademarks and naming rights, and an increased need for 
protection of brewery names and beer brands, both established and new.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 4. See Martin City Brewing May Finally Get its Hard Way IPA trademark 
Registered, KAIDER L. (Feb. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Martin City Brewing], 
http://www.kaiderlaw.com/blog/category/all (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (“A 
‘consent agreement,’ for example, is a common device to resolve a trademark 
dispute . . . These agreements are more common between two parties of more or 
less equal size (two craft breweries, for example.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 5. Marianna Moss, Trademark “Coexistence” Agreements: Legitimate 
Contracts or Tools of Consumer Deception?, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 197, 197 
(2005). 
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Trademark infringement lawsuits generally arise when there 
is a question as to whether the use of a certain trademark creates 
a likelihood of confusion with another mark.6 In other words, the 
inquiry is whether “one mark [is] so close to another that an 
ordinary purchaser is likely to be confused, mistaken, or deceived 
regarding the source of the goods or service.”7 Due to the fact that 
trademark coexistence agreements are contracts made and 
contemplated by the two potentially affected parties,8 the Federal 
Circuit—the court that reviews decisions from the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)9—has maintained a longstanding 
opinion that trademark coexistence agreements should carry 
“great weight” when the TTAB performs a “likelihood of confusion” 
analysis to determine the legitimacy of a mark.10 In fact, in 
Bongrain International Corp. v. Delice De France, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit states: 
We have often said, in trademark cases involving agreements 
reflecting parties’ views on the likelihood of confusion in the 
marketplace, that they are in a much better position to know 
the real life situation than bureaucrats or judges and therefore 
such agreements may, depending on the circumstances, carry 
great weight, as was held in DuPont. Here, the board appears 
effectively to have ignored the views and conduct of the parties 
                                                                                                     
 6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (providing that any person who uses 
any term, name, symbol, device, or combination in commerce, shall be civilly 
liable if he or she is likely to cause confusion of another’s mark).  
 7. George Miaoulis & Nancy D’Amato, Consumer Confusion & Trademark 
Infringement, 42 J. OF MARKETING 48, 49 (1978) (“To make a judgment with regard 
to infringement, the court would like to know what is in the customer’s mind, how 
he is reacting to the two marks, and thus whether he is likely to be deceived.”). 
 8. See David Allen Bernstein, Note, A Case for Mediating Trademark 
Disputes in the Age of Expanding Brands, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 139, 
144–45 (2005) (“In some cases, companies are willing to compromise, which allows 
both parties to continue to use the brand in separate product or service areas. 
This compromise, also known as consent to use agreement, is the optimal 
solution . . . .”). 
 9. See CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, 267 F.3d 660, 674 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
Lanham Act provides two avenues for review of TTAB decisions: review by the 
Federal Circuit on the closed record of the TTAB proceedings; or review by the 
district court with the option of presenting additional evidence and claims.”). 
 10. See Bongrain Int’l Corp. v. Delice De France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1484–
85 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that in trademark cases involving coexistence 
agreements, “great weight” should be given to the agreement when performing a 
confusion analysis because the parties have a more practical understanding of the 
marketplace than “bureaucrats or judges”). 
THE TTAB SHOULD DRINK A BEER AND RELAX 107 
merely because it harbored a different view from the parties on 
likelihood of confusion.11 
Therefore, the Federal Circuit finds that if the parties do not 
believe that coexisting use will cause a confusion in the 
marketplace, then it likely will not occur, and the TTAB need not 
substitute its judgment for that of the parties.12 
On February 25, 2016, the TTAB rendered a decision of great 
importance to the craft brewing industry when it affirmed a ruling 
from the United States Patent and Trademarks Office (USPTO). 
The USPTO refused to register the trademark TIME TRAVELER 
BLONDE on the grounds of confusion with the previously 
registered mark TIME TRAVELER despite an extensive 
trademark coexistence agreement between the two breweries.13 
Bay State Brewing Company (Bay State), a small Massachusetts 
brewery, sought registration on the principal register for the mark 
of TIME TRAVELER BLONDE,14 in standard characters, for 
“beer” within International Class 32, a trademark class that 
includes beers, mineral and aerated waters, and other non-
alcoholic beverages.15 A&S Brewing, a Vermont-based brewing 
                                                                                                     
 11. Id.  
 12. See, e.g., id. at 1485  
Likelihood of confusion under § 2(d) is, as the board said, a question of 
law and as such it is freely reviewable by us. Our review of this case, 
particularly considering the views of the parties on what actually 
happens and is likely to happen in the marketplace as it affects their 
respective businesses, constrains us to disagree with the board. 
 13. See In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *4 
(T.T.A.B. 2016) (citing to the Appellant’s brief). 
In this case, Applicant and [Registrant] made ‘reasoned assessments 
of the marketplace’ in a detailed agreement that is the Long Form 
Agreement submitted on December 30. 2013. This Agreement . . . is a 
non-naked, well-reasoned, and detailed agreement drafted by 
knowledgeable parties intimately familiar with the market and eager 
to avoid confusion. As is shown below the parties crafted an agreement 
designed to avoid confusion in the marketplace and underscored the 
agreement with a mutual commitment to collaborate in avoiding 
confusion in the marketplace. This agreement should be given the 
substantial and great weight as required by the Federal Circuit. 
 14. See id. at *1 (describing the procedural history of the case).  
 15. See International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of 
the Registration of Marks, World Intellectual Property Organization (10th ed. 
2011) (explaining that Class 32 includes mainly non-alcoholic beverages, as well 
as beer). 
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collaborative, successfully registered the mark TIME TRAVELER, 
also in standard characters, for “‘beer, ale and lager’ in 
International Class 32.”16 The USPTO trademark examining 
attorney denied Bay State’s application on the grounds that, when 
used for beer, it “so resembles the previously registered mark” of 
A&S, it is “likely to cause confusion.”17 Following denial by the 
USPTO, Bay State appealed for review by the TTAB.18 In its 
appeal, Bay State emphasized that it had previously entered into 
a consent agreement with A&S brewing that, if followed, would 
eliminate confusion.19 After an in-depth analysis, the TTAB upheld 
the USPTO decision to refuse registration of Bay State’s mark 
notwithstanding the consent agreement, stating that “consumers 
are likely to be confused upon encountering the marks TIME 
TRAVELER BLONDE and TIME TRAVELER, both for ‘beer,’ even 
when used in accordance with the consent agreement.”20  
This Note focuses on the issue of what protections a trademark 
coexistence agreement provides to companies within the craft 
brewing industry in light of the recent TTAB ruling in In re Bay 
State Brewing Company, Inc. In Part II, this Note provides an 
overview of the craft brewing industry and its importance to the 
United States economy.21 Part III offers an overview of coexistence 
agreements as a function of contract law, while also giving a 
primer on trademark law and discussing use within the craft 
brewing industry.22 Part IV analyzes the decision in In re Bay State 
Brewing Company, Inc. and its serious consequences for the craft 
brewing industry, while also focusing on the likelihood of confusion 
analysis for the craft brewing industry as a whole.23 Finally, Part 
V examines the specific Trademark Coexistence Agreement with 
                                                                                                     
 16. In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *1 (T.T.A.B. 
2016)  
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. (explaining that when the examining attorney made refusal final, 
Bay State appealed to the TTAB). 
 19. See id. (“Applicant asserts that it has a consent agreement with 
Registrant, and asserts that ‘the parties acknowledge that confusion is likely 
unless they both adhere to the terms of the [agreement].’”). 
 20. Id. at *10. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.  
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In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc. and uses it as an example 
to discuss the future implications for trademark coexistence 
agreements in the craft brewing industry in light of the new level 
of scrutiny provided by the TTAB’s decision.24  
II. Overview of the Craft Brewing Industry Recent Growth of the 
Craft Brewing Industry 
The beer market in America is as healthy as it has ever been. 
In 2015, “the number of operating breweries in the U.S. grew 
fifteen percent, totaling 4,269 breweries — the most at any time in 
American history.”25 Many individuals likely associate the term 
“craft beer” with any beer that is not “‘Big beer’ (or 
‘MillCoorWeiser’26), the beer produced by Anhueser-Busch InBev 
(ABI) and MillerCoors, which are the two major producers of malt 
beverages in the United States.”27  That being said, the Brewer’s 
Associations—a trade organization that represents “small and 
independent American craft brewers”28—defines a craft brewer as:  
An American craft brewer is small, independent and 
traditional. Small: Annual production of 6 million barrels of 
beer or less (approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual beer sales). 
                                                                                                     
 24. See discussion infra Part V. 
  25. Small and Independent Brewers Continue to Grow Double Digits, 
BREWERS ASS’N (March 22, 2016) [hereinafter Small and Independent Brewers 
Continue to Grow], https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/small-
independent-brewers-continue-grow-double-digits/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. See Adam Millsap, Craft Brewing Has Brought Variety to Oktoberfest, 
FORBES (Sept. 20, 2016, 10:04 A.M.), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/adammillsap/2016/09/15/craft-brewing-has-brought-variety-to-oktoberfest/ 
#763a6c1f468f (last visited Jan. 5, 2017) (“But it wasn’t too long ago that 
American beer drinkers were largely limited to what beer buffs call 
MillCoorWeiser beer—the mass produced American lager prominently sold under 
the Budweiser, Miller, and Coors brand names.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 27. Kenneth G. Elzinga et al., Craft Beer in the United States: History, 
Numbers, and Geography, 10 J. WINE ECON. 242, 244 (2015) (explaining further 
that ABI and MillerCoors combined maintained a share of the market of beer 
sales in the United States of 73% and craft beer maintains less than 10% of the 
domestic market). 
 28. See BREWER’S ASS’N, Small and Independent Brewers Continue to Grow, 
supra note 25. 
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Beer production is attributed to the rules of alternating 
proprietorships. Independent: Less than 25 percent of the craft 
brewery is owned or controlled (or equivalent economic interest) 
by an alcoholic beverage industry member that is not itself a 
craft brewer. Traditional: A brewer that has a majority of its 
total beverage alcohol volume in beers whose flavor derives 
from traditional or innovative brewing ingredients and their 
fermentation. Flavored malt beverages (FMBs) are not 
considered beers.29 
Within the definition of “craft brewer,” there are several sub-
categories of breweries: microbreweries,30 brewpubs,31 
nanobreweries,32 and regional craft breweries.33 The graphic 
below, Figure II.A.1,34 demonstrates the growth of the craft 
brewing industry by each segment of the craft brewing market. 
                                                                                                     
 29. Id. at n. 1.  
 30. See Elzinga et al., supra note 27, at 244 n. 2 (“Microbreweries sell their 
output to a downstream vendor (i.e., a distributor or retailer).”). 
       31. See id. (“[B]rewpubs are vertically integrated and sell direct to the 
consumer at the production point (i.e., its restaurant or bar).”). 
 32. See id. at 244 (“In the taxonomy of craft beer production, there also is the 
nanobrewery, which, unlike home brewers, brews beer for resale but on a very 
small scale (a capacity of three barrels or less).”). 
 33. See Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, BREWERS ASS’N, 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/market-segments/, (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016) (explaining that a regional craft brewery is a brewery, with an 
annual beer production of between 15,000 and 6,000,000 barrels, with a majority 
of volume in “traditional” or “innovative” beer) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 34. See Number of Breweries: U.S. Craft Brewery Count by Category, 
BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/number-of-
breweries/, (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (providing various graphics representing 
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 With the rapid growth in the craft brewing industry, the 
economic impact of the craft brewing industry is undoubted. In 
fact, as of 2015, ninety-nine percent of American breweries (4,225) 
are considered craft breweries and account for a retail value 
estimated at $22.3 billion.35 Additionally, craft breweries do not 
only produce great beer—they also produce great jobs.36 In 2015, 
craft brewers provided nearly 122,000 jobs, which was a 6,000 job 
increase from 2014.37  
A. Local Impacts of Craft Beer 
Craft breweries have a strong economic impact at the local, 
state, and national levels.38 In fact, craft brewers contributed $55.7 
billion to the United States economy in 2014.39 This contribution is 
tremendous when compared to the contribution of $33.9 billion to 
the economy in 201240—a testament to how much the industry has 
recently grown. Figure II.A.241 represents the economic impact 
that craft breweries have on each state.  
                                                                                                     
the number of breweries in the United States) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 35. See BREWERS ASS’N, Small and Independent Brewers Continue to Grow, 
supra note 25 (providing statistical figures that demonstrate the growth of the 
craft brewing industry in 2015). 
 36. See id. (“Small and independent brewers are a beacon for beer and our 
economy . . . . As breweries continue to open and volume increases, there is a 
strong need for workers to fill a whole host of positions at these small and growing 
businesses.”). 
 37. See id. (describing the economic impacts as a result of the craft brewing 
business).  
 38. See Economic Impact, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation. 
org/statistics/economic-impact-data/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (“With a strong 
presence across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, craft breweries are a 
vibrant and flourishing economic force at the local, state, and national level.”). 
 39. See id. (explaining that his figure is “derived from the total impact of 
beer brewed by craft brewers as it moves through the three-tier system 
(breweries, wholesalers, and retailers), as well as all non-beer products like food 
and merchandise that brewpub restaurants and brewery taprooms sell”). 
 40. See Neil Reid & Jay D. Gatrell, Brewing Growth, 14 ECON. DEV. J. 5, 7 
(2015) [hereinafter Brewing Growth] (“In 2012, the industry contributed $33.9 
billion to the U.S. economy and was responsible for more than 360,000 jobs . . . .”). 
 41. Economic Impact, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/ 
statistics/economic-impact-data/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (on file with the 
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As seen in Figure II.A.2, the craft brewing industry generates 
the most economic output from larger states: California, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, New York, and Colorado, form the top five 
producing states in 2014.42 However, the craft brewing industry 
also has economic impacts on smaller states, with Colorado, 
Oregon, Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Alaska making up the top 
five states based off of economic output per capita.43 
Expansion of the craft brewing industry has also created a 
tourism niche as people travel to visit craft breweries.44 As a result 
of growing beer tourism, many communities have developed “craft 
beer trails” that provide suggested itineraries for visiting 
breweries in the area.45 These craft beer trails not only improve 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. See id. (providing the following economic outputs: California ($6.9 
billion), Pennsylvania ($4.5 billion), Texas ($3.8 billion), New York ($2.9 billion), 
Colorado ($2.7 billion)).  
 43. See id. (explaining that this figure is calculated per capita for adults over 
the age of 21).  
 44. See Jennifer Francioni Kraftchick et al., Understanding Beer Tourist 
Motivation, 12 TOURISM MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 41, 41 (2014) (“A beer tourist’s 
primary motivation for travel is to visit a brewery, beer festival, or beer show in 
order to experience the beer-making process and/or tasting of beer.”).  
 45. See Reid & Gatrell, supra note 40, at 8 (2015) (providing examples of 
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local economies and promote travel, but also promote collaboration 
in between breweries—a trend that causes brands to overlap and 
contributes to the collegial atmosphere of the craft brewing 
industry. 46  
In an effort to attract new breweries, some states have 
changed local laws.47 Such local changes are helpful for attracting 
breweries because “[l]aws governing the production, sale, and 
consumption of beer vary significantly from state to state with 
more restrictive laws placing some [less restrictive] states at a 
competitive advantage.”48 The willingness of states to alter laws in 
an effort to attract craft breweries demonstrates the importance of 
craft breweries to states and their economies. 
B. Legislative Incentives for Craft Beer 
Because of the impact that craft breweries have on national 
and state economies, governments at every level have taken 
actions that effect the craft brewing industry. In 1978, Congress 
reduced the federal excise tax on beer from $9.00/barrel to 
$7.00/barrel for the first 60,000 barrels that were produced by 
breweries with less than two million barrels in total annual sales.49 
Additionally, at the time of this Note, legislation has been 
introduced into both the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives, under the title of the Craft Beverage 
Modernization and Tax Reform Act of 2015. 50  The proposed 
legislation has strong support from the industry because the act is 
tailored to promote job creation in craft brewing.51 Among other 
                                                                                                     
craft beer trails in Columbus, Ohio; Kalamazoo, Michigan; and Louisville, 
Kentucky).  
 46. See id. (providing the example that “[i]n Mills River, NC, Sierra Nevada’s 
popular ‘Beer Camp’ model, which builds on a collaborative co-branding initiative 
with smaller craft houses . . . .” has had a positive impact on the local economy). 
 47. See id. at 10 (describing that in an effort to attract Stone Brewing 
Company, South Carolina governor signed a bill that removed many restrictions 
on craft breweries and discussing current legislation in Ohio that would raise the 
state’s maximum ABV to 21 percent). 
 48. Id.  
 49. See Elzinga et al., supra note 27 at 244, n.2 (describing the reduction in 
the federal excise tax as a “windfall for craft brewers”). 
 50. S.1562, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2903, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 51. See Federal Excise Tax Overview: Craft Beer Modernization and Tax 
114 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 103 (2017) 
aims, the legislation will reduce excise tax and regulatory burdens 
for brewers, reducing the federal excise tax to $3.50/barrel on the 
first 60,000 barrels for domestic brewers producing less than two 
million barrels annually.52 This reduction in the excise tax will 
create more cash flow for brewers, allowing for reinvestment in 
their businesses and expansion of their breweries and expand 
distribution.53 Additionally, the legislation would increase 
collaboration between brewers by removing restrictions on tax-free 
transfers of beer, repealing unnecessary inventory restrictions, 
and allowing expansions of breweries for packaging and storage 
facilities.54 These legislative effects are designed to help craft 
breweries grow and expand by allowing small brewers to 
collaborate on new beers by giving them the flexibility to transfer 
beer between breweries without tax liability.55 With such 
legislation being implemented to help the craft brewery industry 
expand, the TTAB’s ruling in In re Bay State Brewing Company56 
may restrict these aims and reduce the collaboration between 
these breweries.  
                                                                                                     
Reform Act of 2015, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/ 
government-affairs/craft-beverage-modernization-and-tax-reform-act/federal-
excise-tax-overview/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (“The intent of the bill is to update 
and modernize the excise tax and regulatory requirements for craft brewers as 
well as vintners and distillers, and thereby help to ensure the continued growth 
of America’s craft beverage industries.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 52. See id. (describing Section 201 of the bill introduced into the House of 
Representatives and Section 201 of the bill introduced into the Senate). 
 53. See id. (explaining that Section 201 of the bill is designed to “[r]ecalibrate 
excise taxes for brewers to provide more cash flow to allow them to reinvest in 
their businesses”). 
 54. See id. (describing Section 204 of the bill introduced into the House of 
Representatives and Section 204 of the bill introduced into the Senate). 
 55. See Majority of U.S. Senators Support Beer Tax Reform, BREWERS ASS’N, 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/majority-u-s-senators-
support-beer-tax-reform/ (last updated Sept. 26, 2016) (last visited Jan. 6, 2016) 
(discussing specific provisions within the introduced legislation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 56. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of In 
re Bay State Brewing Company). 
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C. Geographical Distribution of Craft Beer 
While all Americans love beer, the distribution of craft 
breweries is not even throughout the United States.57 Several 
theories attempt to explain the uneven distribution of breweries 
during the growth of the industry.58 One theory that may explain 
this growth and distribution is the resource partitioning theory, 
which explains that as a market expands, it divides into special 
segments.59 Craft brewers have emerged to address the needs of a 
certain segment.60 Neil Reid, a craft brewing expert who has 
published multiple works on the topic, has stated that he is partial 
to the resource partitioning theory because it “explains the 
emergence of the craft beer industry as a response to consumer 
dissatisfaction with American pale lager that has, up until 
recently, dominated American palates.”61 Specifically, “craft beer 
appears to resonate particularly strongly with the millennial 
demographic cohort who seems attracted to its diversity of styles 
and flavors.”62 Therefore, one explanation for the distribution of 
the industry is that craft breweries have emerged in areas where 
                                                                                                     
       57. See Neil Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz: American Craft Beer 
Comes to Age, 57 FOCUS ON GEOGRAPHY 114, 114 (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter From 
Yellow Fizz to Big Biz] (“Growth of the craft brewing industry has been unevenly 
distributed across both space and time. There are states where the industry has 
a strong presence and those where it is weakly represented.”). 
 58. See id. (explaining that the emergence and growth of the craft brewing 
industry is a result of resource partitioning and is part of a broader neo-localism 
movement).  
 59. See id. (explaining the resource partitioning theory and how this theory 
applies to the craft brewing industry). 
 60. See Neil Reid et al., Conference Paper, The Ubiquity of Good Taste: A 
Spatial Analysis of the Craft Brewing Industry in the United States, 53rd 
Congress of the European Regional Science Association: Regional Integration: 
Europe, the Mediterranean and the World Economy, 4 (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter 
Conference Paper] (“Over time, however, some consumers express dissatisfaction 
with the homogeneous product and a market evolves for higher quality and 
differentiated styles of beer.”). 
 61. See Neil Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz, supra note 57, at 114. 
 62. Id.; see also Reid et al., Conference Paper, supra note 60, at 4 (“Craft beer 
is attractive to a discernable demographic. The typical consumer of craft beer is 
male, white, earns at least $75,000 per year, works in the service sector, and is 
college educated.”); Reid & Gatrell, supra note 40 (“[C]raft breweries tend to be 
more numerous in metropolitan areas whose populations exhibit higher levels of 
social tolerance, and where a greater share of those who live there are young (aged 
25-44), educated, and non-Hispanic whites.”). 
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it can best serve these distinct populations and satisfy the desires 
for beers other than the typical MillCoorWeiser.63 
Second, it appears that the craft brewing industry is a part of 
a larger neo-localism movement that is defined as “the deliberate 
seeking out of regional lore and local attachment by residents (new 
and old) as a delayed reaction to the destruction in modern 
America of traditional bonds to the community and family.”64 Craft 
breweries are part of “the larger ‘buy-local’ movement that has 
grown in popularity in recent years, particularly with respect to 
the purchase of locally-grown food by ‘localvores.’”65 As a response 
to this movement, many craft breweries attempt to capitalize on 
local connections in advertising and marketing strategies.66 Such 
advertising and marketing strategies “[c]reat[e] an attachment to 
the local area, especially its history and landscape, [that] is often 
reflected in the names that craft brewers chose for the portfolio of 
beers that they brew.”67 The desire to use local names for their 
beers limits brewery name choices and has created a trend for 
creating trademark coexistence agreements with other breweries. 
Unfortunately, this trend may be undermined by In re Bay State 
Brewing Company, as will be discussed in detail in Part V of this 
Note.68  
                                                                                                     
 63. See Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz, supra note 57, at 116 (“In 
the case of the beer industry the craft brewers have emerged to meet this demand 
for variety; a variety that is manifest in terms of greater choice with respect to 
style, flavor, and strength of beer.”). 
 64. Id.  
 65. Reid et al., Conference Paper, supra note 60, at 6. 
 66. See Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz, supra note 57, at 117 
(“[M]any craft breweries consciously foster the concept of neo-localism and have 
purposefully catered to these cravings for connection through targeted marketing 
strategies that emphasize local identity and distinctiveness.”). 
 67. Id. (providing an example that Great Lakes brewing Company in 
Cleveland brews the Edmund Fitzgerald Porter, named after a Great Lakes 
freighter (the SS Edmund Fitzgerald) that sank on Lake Superior during a storm 
in 1975).  
 68. See infra Part V. Examination of Specific Trademark Coexistence 
Agreement in In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc. and the Implications for 
Future Coexistence Agreements in the Craft Brewing Industry (examining the 
TTAB’s decision and the implications that the decision will have on the craft 
brewing industry). 
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The above mentioned theories may help explain the uneven 
distribution of craft breweries throughout the United States.69 The 
largest geographic concentrations of craft breweries are found in 
the Pacific Northwest, California, the Northeast, the Great Lakes, 
and the Mountain West.70 Figure II.A.371 below demonstrates the 
Craft Beer Production by State since 1980.  
  
                                                                                                     
 69. See Reid et al., Conference Paper, supra note 60, at 5 (“The demographics 
of the market may impact the geography of the industry as regions and locales 
whose demographic and economic characteristics are attractive to craft brewers 
are more likely to possess a higher number of microbreweries and brewpubs.”). 
 70. See Reid & Gatrell, Brewing Growth, supra note 40, at 6 (explaining that 
the following cities are responsible for such geographic distribution: Seattle, 
Portland, San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, Riverside, New 
York, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis, Detroit, 
and Denver).  
 71. Elzinga et al., supra note 27, at 261. 
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Figure II.A.3 shows that the craft brewing industry has grown 
exponentially since 1980, when there was only one craft brewer 
outside of the state of California.72 Further, the above chart 
demonstrates that “craft beer production moved sequentially into 
the Pacific Northwest, the Northeast, and then the upper 
Midwest.”73 Based on the time-lapsed geographic map, it is 
apparent that craft brewing was slow to move into lower 
Midwestern and Southern states and was not brewed in every 
state until 2001.74 Additionally as Figure II.A.3 demonstrates, it is 
evident that expansion of craft brewing is not random,75 and these 
evolving clusters contribute to more overlapping distribution 
markets within the craft brewing industry—an issue that the 
TTAB acknowledges in In re Bay State Brewing Co. Inc.76  
D. Continued Expansion of Craft Beer 
As there are no indications that the expansion of craft brewing 
will stop anytime soon, the geographical overlap and distribution 
described above will likely become more crowded.77 The continuous 
expansion of craft beer also includes successful and established 
breweries that search for new production locations to expand their 
markets.78 The expansion of such breweries hinges on some factors 
                                                                                                     
 72. See id. at 258 (explaining that craft beer originated in California, where 
97% of craft beer was produced in 1980, as there was only one brewer outside of 
the state who was located in Boulder, Colorado). 
 73. Id.  
 74. See id. at 260 (describing production of craft beer while also explaining 
that a similar geographic pattern emerges when examining the number of craft 
brewers per state as compared to the total production by state). 
 75. See id. (“The geographic distribution of craft beer appears to be anything 
but random, raising the question: What caused the geographic clustering of 
economic activity in craft brewing . . . ?”). 
 76. See In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *8 
(T.T.A.B. 2016) (“[A]lthough Applicant’s use, by the terms of the agreement, is 
limited to New York, a nationwide registration issued to the Applicant would give 
Applicant presumptive nationwide exclusive rights.”); See also infra Part V.B.2 
(examining the TTAB’s discussion of the geographic restrictions in Bay State 
Brewing’s agreement). 
 77. See Reid et al., From Yellow Fizz to Big Biz, supra note 57, at 123–24 
(“At the time of writing, the growth in the number of craft breweries shows no 
sign of abating.”).  
 78. See Reid & Gatrell, Brewing Growth, supra note 40, at 6 (“[T]he need for 
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that are directly related to a geographical area.79 For example, the 
water content of a particular area is important in determining 
location of a brewery because of the amount of water used in beer 
production.80 Additionally, access to highways for transport and 
distribution are important for breweries in deciding where to 
expand their operation.81 Furthermore, factors that relate to the 
demographics of the area, particularly to the neo-localism 
movement, are important in determining future sites for breweries 
and production facilities.82 As breweries expand their geographic 
footprint, successful craft breweries become national brands, 
which further crowds the market and provides more pressure on 
branding and trademarking options for new and emerging 
breweries.83  
                                                                                                     
a second production location arises as the brewery is successful, demand for its 
beer increases, and the geographic footprint of its market expands. As growing 
breweries ship their product to more geographically distinct markets, their 
transportation costs increase.”). 
 79. See id. at 10 (“[T]he historical factors that determine the geography of 
site selection are changing.”). 
 80. See id. at 9 
With water being a key ingredient of beer, Stone was particularly 
interest in the type, availability, and quality of the water. The brewery 
will use approximately 215,000 gallons of water per day. While water 
treatment is now standard practice in the industry, water quality and 
its specific characteristics—hardness, alkalinity, and chlorinity—
influence location.  
 81. See id. (“Access to interstate highways and concerns about water were 
also important to Sierra Nevada Brewing Company when there were looking for 
a second production location in the eastern United States.”). 
 82. See id. (“Indeed the traditional concept of a community’s ‘business 
climate’ has now been expanded to include softer cultural factors (i.e., perceived 
‘progressiveness’, availability of brownfield sites, sustainability, and so on) and 
the political will to rapidly respond and revise arcane regulations.”). 
 83. See id. (“The expanding geographic footprint of these highly successful 
craft breweries means that they are increasingly becoming national brands. For 
example, New Belgium Brewing Company’s beer is available in 36 states plus 
D.C., while Green Flash Brewing Company’s beer is sold in 40 states.”). 
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1. Growth of the Craft Brewing Industry Has Led to 
Trademarking and Naming Issues 
As explained above, the craft brewing industry is growing at a 
rapid pace.84 With a growing industry and a limited possible 
number of names, brands, and labeling designs, many of which 
have trademark protection, there will naturally be overlap in some 
of the brands and names for certain beers.85 Arguably, the most 
important aspect in having a successful beer (aside from taste) is 
maintaining a successful brand name and image.86 The importance 
of maintaining a successful brand combined with the large boom 
in the craft brewing industry and the limited number of names, 
brands, and designs, has led to an increase in trademark litigation 
within the craft brewing industry.87 For brewery owners the 
                                                                                                     
 84. See supra Part I.A (explaining the recent growth of the craft brewing 
industry and the economic impact that it has had). 
 85. See Sara Randazo, Hopportunity Cost: Craft Brewers Brawl Over Catchy 
Names as Puns Run Dry, WALL STREET J. (July 10, 2016, 1:10 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hopportunity-cost-craft-brewers-brawl-over-catchy-
names-as-puns-run-dry-1468170639 (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (detailing the 
issues associated with numerous attempting to name beers with relevant puns) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally The Great Beer 
Trademark Wars: Brewers Head to the Courts to Protect Their Brands, ALL ABOUT 
BEER MAG., http://allaboutbeer.com/article/beer-trademarks/, (April 30, 2014) 
(last visited September 7, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 86. See Ulrich R. Orth et al., Promoting Brand Benefits: The Role of 
Consumer Psychographics and Lifestyle, 21 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 97, 98 (2004) 
(“Craft beers are such an object with relatively few attributes that physically 
differentiate products, and brand names have been shown to have considerable 
importance in the purchase decision.”). 
 87. See Rebecca S. Winder, Note, Trademark Protection in the Craft Brewing 
Industry: A Beer by Any Other Name May Be an Infringement, 15 WAKE FOREST 
J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 148, 149 (2014) 
While craft brewing focuses on using unique ingredients to create one-
of-a-kind beers, there exists a limited universe of creative names for 
breweries and their products. The limited naming options have become 
strained as more and more craft breweries open every day in America 
and more of the older, well-established craft breweries seek trademark 
protection for their brand names. By seeking such protection, these 
breweries are sending a message to the rest of the industry that they 
are willing to use the legal system to protect their brands. 
See also Carolyn Heneghan, Why Beverage Industry Lawsuits Are Increasing, 
FOOD DIVE, http://www.fooddive.com/news/why-beverage-industry-lawsuits-are-
increasing/411817/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (discussing how the rapid 
expansion of the beverage industry has led to an increase in trademark disputes, 
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thought of trademark litigation can be daunting and many owners 
likely share the viewpoint of Matt Nadeau, the owner of Rock Art 
Brewery based in Morrisville, Vermont, who expressed the 
difficulties that breweries face when threatened with trademark 
litigation: 
The way the system is set up, I’m being explained by these 
trademark lawyers, is that this will enter the court system and 
this $1 billion corporation will be allowed to fight this in the 
courts with dollars. If I win the first round, they can appeal. 
And if I win the second round, they can appeal. And all the time, 
this starts at $65,000 for each court case and goes and goes. And 
at some point obviously, a small little Vermont brewery is not 
going to be able to afford this anymore. And what happens at 
that point when you’re involved in this legal battle and can no 
longer afford to represent yourself, you lose by default. The 
court system says you default lose. What happens then? I have 
to change the name of the beer and move on if there’s any 
brewery left.88 
Matt Nadea’s description encompasses the fear that many 
craft brewery owners face and, even when there may not be any 
trademark infringement, craft brewery owners are often 
overwhelmed by the threat of litigation and are advised by counsel 
to take alternate courses of action.89 One such alternative is to 
                                                                                                     
misleading claims, and distribution rights violations); Michael Kanach et. al, The 
Brewhaha: Working with Craft Breweries for Trademark, Brand Protection, and 
Other Issues, A.B. A. SECT. INTELL. PROP. L., (Mar. 27, 2015, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_proper
ty_law/2015/spring/materials/aba-ipl-brewhahacraftbeertrademarks-kanach-
pdf-combined.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited September 20, 2016) (discussing 
recent disputes and indicating that the national median cost of trademark 
litigation up through discovery is $151,000 and through trial is $300,000,which 
demonstrates the incentive to enter into trademark coexistence agreements) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Robyn Ross, Trouble Brewing, 
TEXAS MONTHLY (Jan. 2016), http://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/trouble-
brewing/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (analyzing a dispute between two Texas 
Breweries and describing the steps and the consequences with regard to the 
USPTO) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 88. Ross Appel, Worry Wort: A Path to Acquiring Trademark Rights in the 
Craft Brewing Industry, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA, & ENT. L. J. 1030, 
1045–46 (2015) (citing Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 625, 627–628 (2011)).  
 89. See id. at 1046 (“A Vermont attorney advised Nadeau that there was no 
infringement but that he should consider his family, his employees, and the future 
of the business and simply change the name.”); see also Winder, supra note 87, at 
148 (“Having just started your own business, you do not have the excess funds 
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enter into a trademark coexistence agreement with another 
party90—the method that Bay State Brewing chose, which was 
ultimately invalidated by In re Bay State Brewing Company.91 
 
III. Overview of Trademark Coexistence Agreements 
A. Trademark Law Primer 
The Lanham Act of 1946 defines a trademark as “any word, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination” used or intended to 
be used in commerce that can “identify and distinguish his or her 
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or 
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.”92 Trademark law serves dual goals—“to 
protect consumers from deception and confusion over trade 
symbols and to protect the plaintiff’s infringed trademark as 
property.”93 Trademarks play an important economic role as they 
encourage the production of quality products and reduce the 
                                                                                                     
necessary to hire an attorney and take the dispute to court. Instead, you can 
either work with the other brewer. . . or you can appeal to your. . . supporters. . . 
attempt[ing] to get the other brewer to back down.”).  
 90. See Christina Sauerborn, Trademark Troubles Overflow for the Craft 
Beer Industry, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA, & ENT. L. J. (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2016/11/08/trademark-craft-beer-industry/ (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2017) (explaining that “another workaround that can be used to 
navigate trademark disputes is a ‘coexistence agreement,’ where two or more 
parties consent to one another’s registrations and mutually plan how to 
distinguish themselves in the marketplace”). 
 91. See supra Part IV. (discussing the TTAB’s analysis of In re Bay State 
Brewing Company). 
 92. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (2006). 
 93. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2016); see also S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 
3 (1946)  
The purpose underlying any trademark statute is twofold. One is to 
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product 
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get 
the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the 
owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting 
to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its 
misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-established 
rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.  
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customer’s costs of making purchasing decisions.94 Generally, 
trademarks perform four functions that merit protection in the 
courts.95 First, trademarks “identify one seller’s goods and 
distinguish them from goods sold by others,” and second, they 
“signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from or are 
controlled by a single, albeit anonymous source.”96 Third, 
trademarks “signify that all goods bearing the trademark are of an 
equal level of quality” and fourth, they are used “as a prime 
instrument in advertising and selling the goods.”97 It is also 
important to note that a trademark represents the good will that a 
business has built up.98 Therefore, trademarks are used to reduce 
consumer confusion by clearly identifying the source of a good, 
while also encouraging competition by granting producers 
exclusive rights to use their trademarks and the good will 
associated with them.99 
Trademark law differs from other forms of intellectual 
property law (such as patents, copyrights, or trade secrets) as 
trademark law “does not depend upon novelty, invention, 
discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or 
imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.”100 Instead, 
trademark protection is awarded to an individual who is first to 
use a distinctive mark in commerce.101 Thus, it is the use of a mark 
in commerce that gives the originator of a mark trademark 
protection.102 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at § 2:3 (4th ed. 2016). 
 95. Id. at § 3:2. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See id. (“If this consumer satisfaction and preference is labeled ‘good 
will,’ then a trademark is the symbol by which the world can identify that good 
will.”). 
 99. Id. at § 2:1; see also MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2016, VOLUME II: COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
STATE IP PROTECTIONS, V-3 (2016) (describing that consumers largely rely on 
trademarks in situations when it is difficult to inspect a product quickly and 
cheaply to determine its quality). 
 100. LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 99, at V-4 (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 
U.S. 82, 94 (1879)). 
 101. Id. at V-5. 
 102. Id. at V-6.  
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Trademark registration is not required for trademark 
protection, but registration on the USPTO Principal Register 
provides presumptive evidence of trademark protection.103 Federal 
trademark registration can be accomplished either through the 
filing a use-based application,104 under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), or an 
intent-to-use application under § 1051(b). 105 If the application is 
approved by the USPTO, the mark is placed on the USPTO 
Principal Register, and the mark holder possesses an exclusive 
right to use the trademark in connection with the particular good 
or service for which it is registered.106 Essentially, this means that 
a senior user of a registered mark may prevent subsequent users 
from using the registered mark or one that is similar where there 
is a likelihood of confusion between the two marks.107 
Registration may also be acquired under the concurrent use 
doctrine, which was codified into the Lanham Act in 1946 as 15 
U.S.C. § 1052(d). The concurrent use doctrine “allows different 
owners to use the same or similar marks in commerce under 
certain circumstances.”108 The concurrent use doctrine arose out of 
common law and made it possible for different users to create 
similar marks independently of each other, providing a system 
which did not punish a subsequent user who used the similar mark 
in a geographically remote area and adopted the similar mark in 
                                                                                                     
 103. See id. at V-103 (explaining that the primary advantages to registration 
are “nationwide constructive use and constructive notice, which cut off rights of 
other users of the same or similar marks” and “the possibility of achieving 
incontestable status after five years, which greatly enhances rights by 
eliminating a number of defenses”). 
 104. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2002) (describing the procedure for the owner 
of a trademark that is currently used in commerce to request registration of its 
trademark on the principal register).  
 105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2002) (describing the procedure for a person 
who has a good-faith bona fide intention to use a mark in commerce to request 
registration of its trademark on the principal register).  
 106. See Winder, supra note 87, at 153 (explaining the process for acquiring 
federal trademark registration on the principal register under the Lanham Act). 
 107. See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 99, at V-5 (2016) (explaining the 
importance of trademark protection for the senior user); see also id. at 153–54 
(“After acquiring the mark, it is up to the mark holder to defend it by informing 
users of confusingly similar marks that they must cease their potentially 
infringing use of the mark.”). 
 108. David S. Barrett, The Future of the Concurrent Use of Trademarks 
Doctrine in the Information Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 687, 688 (2001).  
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an innocent manner using good faith.109 Indeed, this common law 
doctrine has been defined as “the result of a court’s desire to find 
an equitable balance between trademark users and the buyers of 
the goods or services.”110 
 
B. General Overview of Trademark Coexistence Agreements as a 
Part of Contract Law 
1. Trademark Coexistence Agreements Defined 
Trademark coexistence agreements are creatures of contract 
law which allow potentially confusing trademarks to coexist 
without trademark infringement lawsuits.111 The International 
Trademark Association (INTA) defines trademark coexistence 
agreements as an “[a]greement by two or more persons that similar 
marks can coexist without any likelihood of confusion; allows the 
parties to set rules by which the marks can peacefully coexist.”112 
A consent agreement is a form of coexistence agreement, which is 
often abbreviated, however the two terms often are used 
interchangeably.113 Trademark consent or coexistence agreements 
                                                                                                     
 109. See id. at 689–90 (providing a brief history of the concurrent use 
doctrine). 
 110.  Id. at 690. 
 111. See Moss, supra note 5, at 197 (describing the purpose of trademark 
coexistence agreements which are often agreed upon between manufacturers of 
similar products); see also Lawrence W. Greene, The Ties that Bind? 
Considerations in Drafting and Maintaining U.S. Trademark Consent and 
Coexistence Agreements, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/TheTiesThatBindConsiderationsinDraf
tingandMaintainingUSTrademarkConsentandCoexistenceAgreements.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2017) (“Consent agreements and coexistence agreements are 
indispensable tools for resolving present or possible future disputes between two 
parties about the use and/or registration of arguably similar marks for related 
goods or services.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 112. INTA Glossary, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, http://www.inta.org/ 
TrademarkBasics/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (also explaining 
that “concurrent use agreement” is defined as an “[a]greement by two or more 
persons to use the same mark in connection with the same or similar goods or 
services; usually limited by geographic boundaries”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 113. See Consent or Coexistence? Deciding Which Trademark Agreement to 
Use, Practical Law: Thomson Reuters (Jun. 3, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/7-
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may be introduced by parties attempting to obtain trademark 
registration.114 While these agreements vary in form and 
substance from case to case, “often, a consent agreement is the 
trademark applicant’s best option for convincing the Examiner 
that their proposed mark will not cause a likelihood of confusion 
with the mark cited against their application.”115 A consent 
agreement will often be considered by the examining attorney as 
evidence that there is no likelihood of confusion.116 
2. Judicial Interpretation of Trademark Coexistence Agreements 
Trademark coexistence agreements carry more weight and 
legal consequences in the United States than internationally.117 In 
most international jurisdictions, coexistence agreements are used 
as evidence in acquiring trademark registration, however, once a 
mark is registered, the “useful life of the consent agreement can 
come to an abrupt end.”118 On the contrary, in the United States, 
                                                                                                     
569-3945 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (explaining that a trademark consent 
agreement is a relatively simple agreement where one party grants the other 
consent to use and register a trademark whereas coexistence agreements are 
more comprehensive, generally including use and registration limitations for both 
marks involved in the agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 114. See Is a Co-Existence Agreement the Right Choice For Your Brand?, L. 
OFF. JOSEPH C. MESSINA, http://www.ny-trademark-lawyer.com/is-a-co-existence-
agreement-the-right-choice-for-your-brand.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) 
(explaining the factors that a company or individual should weigh in determining 
whether to enter into a trademark co-existence agreement) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. (suggesting that the reasoning behind considering co-existence 
agreements as evidence of no likelihood of confusion “is that the parties most 
affected by potential consumer confusion are declaring that confusion will not 
result”). 
 117. See Consent or Coexistence? Deciding Which Trademark Agreement to 
Use, Practical Law: Thomson Reuters (Jun. 3, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/7-
569-3945 (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (explaining the more significant legal life of a 
consent agreement in the United States as compared to many international 
jurisdictions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 118. See id. (describing that many international trademark offices focus on 
acting in the public interest and are extremely discretionary in their acceptance 
of consent agreements to allow a party to overcome a citation to the other party’s 
mark, and once accepted the agreement essentially ends).  
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because trademark coexistence agreements “play a more 
fundamental role in defining or redefining the scope of each party’s 
trademark rights, they are given great weight by the USPTO.”119 
As discussed above, the deference given to coexistence agreements 
has been noted by the Federal Circuit, as it has stated that “in 
trademark cases involving agreements reflecting parties’ views on 
the likelihood of confusion in the marketplace, that they are in a 
much better position to know the real life situation than 
bureaucrats or judges and therefore such agreements may, 
depending on the circumstances, carry great weight.”120 
 The Federal Circuit—the court that has jurisdiction to review 
many TTAB decisions—is not the only court to give great deference 
to trademark coexistence agreements, respecting the freedom of 
parties to contract. For example, in Times Mirror Magazines v. 
Field & Stream Licenses Co.,121 the Second Circuit refused to set 
aside a trademark coexistence agreement.122 In the case, the 
plaintiff sued for (among other things) breach of contract and 
trademark infringement and sought cancellation of all contracts, 
specifically the trademark coexistence agreement with the 
defendant regarding the “FIELD & STREAM” mark.123 The 
plaintiff contended that the trademark coexistence agreement 
should have been voided because “they [would] inevitably cause 
substantial confusion and thus injure the public interest.”124 The 
plaintiff further argued that the district court erred by “requiring 
injury to the public rather than simply a heightened showing of 
confusion”—an argument that the Second Circuit found 
unpersuasive.125 The Second Circuit held that “in order to obtain 
                                                                                                     
 119. See id. (discussing the fact that because trademark coexistence 
agreements play a more prominent role in the United States than abroad, there 
are more factors to consider when deciding whether to enter into an agreement 
and how to draft such an agreement).  
 120. Supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.  
 121. 294 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 122. See id. at 384 (“Because defendants acted within their rights under the 
agreements and [plaintiff] has not shown that the public interest requires 
rescission of the contracts, we affirm.”). 
 123. See id. at 388 (explaining the lawsuit and the district court decision that 
upheld the trademark coexistence agreement as a valid and well-reasoned 
agreement). 
 124. Id. at 395. 
 125. See id. (explaining the reasoning of the court and discussing that 
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rescission of a freely bargained trademark contract, a party must 
show that the public interest will be significantly injured if the 
contract is allowed to stand.”126  The court reasoned that “simple 
fairness” requires an adherence to contracts unless that “will 
damage the public and not just a contracting party.”127 
Additionally, the Second Circuit explicitly states that the public 
interest will not be significantly injured if confusion causes 
members of the public “to buy products of equal quality that do not 
threaten their health of safety” and as a result, the trademark 
coexistence agreement shall be upheld.128 Using the rationale of 
the Second Circuit, it would seem that a trademark coexistence 
agreement between two breweries (such as the agreement in In re 
Bay State Brewing Co., Inc.) for the names of beer, would never 
rise to the level of causing significant injury to the public interest, 
as confusion would only cause a consumer to purchase the wrong 
beer (a product of equal quality) and would not threaten the 
consumer’s health or safety.129 
Similar to the Second Circuit, the TTAB—the administrative 
body that decided In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc.—has also given 
great deference in the past to trademark coexistence agreements. 
In Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes, Inc.,130 the 
TTAB granted summary judgment on behalf of an applicant who 
filed to register the mark EYE CANDY for use on fashion 
accessories.131 The opposer, who had a previously used mark EYE 
CANDY for the use on similar fashion products,132 contended that 
                                                                                                     
trademark agreements are favored under the law and “courts considering 
negotiated agreements governing mark use accord them greater deference than 
they give to equitable defenses . . .”). 
 126. Id. at 396.  
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. (explaining further that in the absence of significant harm to the 
public, a plaintiff should not be permitted to void the contractual terms of a 
trademark coexistence agreement).  
 129. See id. (discussing that the district court correctly upheld the contract 
because a purchase of a similar product would not threaten the health or safety 
of the public).  
 130. 2002 WL 745591 (T.T.A.B.2002). 
 131. See id. at *1 (explaining that the applicant is being opposed for 
registration of mark by an opposer who has a similar mark pending application, 
but the two parties have previously entered into a trademark coexistence 
agreement).  
 132. See id. (explaining that the opposer’s mark was for “retail stores 
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the applicant’s mark should not be registered because it was "likely 
to cause confusion, mistake or deception.”133 Prior to application, 
the applicant and the opposer entered into a trademark 
coexistence agreement, which among other things, stipulated that 
the opposer would not object to the application for the EYE 
CANDY mark and in return the applicant would not object to the 
opposer using EYE CANDY as a store name in New York City.134 
Applicant argued that registration should be permitted due to the 
terms of the trademark coexistence agreement—an agreement 
that opposer contended was ambiguous and without 
consideration.135 The TTAB reached its conclusion that 
registration should be permitted solely on the basis of the 
trademark coexistence agreement.136 Consequently, in basing its 
decision solely on a contractual agreement, the TTAB did not 
consider “any outside policy questions, such as consumer 
confusion, injury to public interest, etc.”137 After acknowledging 
the existence of a coexistence agreement, the TTAB only concerned 
itself with contractual issues—once it found that the coexistence 
agreement was clear and unambiguous on its face, it had no 
problem in granting summary judgment for the applicant.138 
Additionally, the TTAB addressed the contention that no 
consideration was given for the agreement, and found that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the consideration 
for the trademark coexistence agreement.139 In responding to the 
consideration argument, the TTAB noted that “the coexistence 
                                                                                                     
featuring jewelry, watches, money clips, cuff links, key chains, clocks, handbags, 
purses, shawls, scarves, gloves, and decorative hair clips and pins . . .”).  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at *3. 
 135. Id. at *3–4. 
 136. See id. at *5 (“After careful consideration of the short, two-page 
coexistence agreement, the arguments and evidentiary submission presented by 
each party, we find that applicant has met its burden on summary 
judgment . . . and that it is entitled to registration as a matter of law.”). 
 137. Moss, supra note 5, at 210. 
 138. See Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes, Inc., 2002 WL 
745591, *5 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (explaining that the appropriate way to interpret an 
agreement is not on the subjective intention of the parties, but rather on the 
objective words of the parties and if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on 
its face, it should be upheld). 
 139. Id. at *5. 
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agreement itself evidences consideration” as both parties give up 
rights when entering into such an agreement and thus form a valid 
contract.140  
The previously described opinions demonstrate the 
willingness of courts to accept and give deference to trademark 
coexistence agreements on the grounds of contract law.141 
Following the logic of the Time Mirror Magazine and Ron 
Cauldwell Jewelry, courts should balance the public interest while 
giving weight to the “freedom and sanctity of contracts.”142 
Ultimately, while marks may be similar and potentially lead to 
consumer confusion, trademark coexistence agreements provide 
protection (at least in some jurisdictions) based off of the 
agreement, as long as the confusion would not significantly injure 
the public and the agreement appears to meet all requirements for 
a proper contract.  
C. Trademark Coexistence Agreement Use Within the Craft 
Brewing Industry 
Trademark coexistence or consent agreements are often used 
in the craft brewing industry to attempt to avoid trademark 
disputes.143 Consent agreements allow parties to negotiate a deal 
that allows for their trademarks to peacefully coexist in a manner 
that avoids a likelihood of confusion.144 With the expansion of the 
craft brewing industry and the natural overlap of names and 
brands, it is beneficial for smaller breweries to enter into mutually 
beneficial consent agreements.145 As a result, many breweries 
                                                                                                     
 140. See id. at *5 (explaining that in “exchange for opposer not objecting to 
applicant’s use and registration, applicant indicated that opposer’s use for its 
store was acceptable” constituted consideration for the agreement).  
 141. See, e.g., id. at *5 (describing the review of the coexistence agreement 
as a contract). 
 142. See Moss, supra note 5, at 221 (discussing that coexistence agreements 
should be evaluated on a “sliding scale,” largely depending on whether confusion 
would cause serious injury to the public interest, such as health issues caused by 
purchasing the wrong medication).  
 143. See Martin City Brewing, supra note 4 (describing the usefulness of a 
trademark coexistence agreement in the craft brewing industry). 
 144. See supra Part III.B (providing background information on trademark 
coexistence agreements).  
 145. See Benefits and Risks of Trademark Coexistence Agreements, 
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enter into coexistence agreements as a “surefire strategy for 
getting a trademark registration in the face of a likelihood of 
confusion refusal.”146  
One explanation for why trademark consent agreements are 
appealing to the craft brewing industry is the unique culture that 
the industry embodies.147 Because most craft breweries are small, 
they often “do not have the resources to mass market their 
products, so instead, they focus their energy to the local 
community, tailoring their distribution to local bars, restaurants, 
and beer festivals” and cultivate local community support.148 
Additionally, the craft brewing industry is one based on 
collaboration, as many breweries work together to brew beer and 
launch new products.149 Collaboration brews are usually beneficial 
for both brewers involved as it gives the parties an opportunity to 
share brewing expertise and creativity “while simultaneously 
supporting each other by providing access to markets that each 
brewer would normally be unable to reach.”150 The combination of 
local support and collaboration are key aspects that make the craft 
brewing industry one that is close-knit and collegial.151  
                                                                                                     
PRACTICAL LAW: THOMSON REUTERS (Sep. 16, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/4-
540-5507?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (explaining that 
trademark coexistence agreements can be a “cost-effective and efficient way to 
resolve an actual or potential conflict”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 146. Cynthia A. Moyer, 99 Bottles of Beer on the Wall—2 With the Same 
Name, LAW 360 (Mar. 17, 2016, 11:24 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
770574/99-bottles-of-beer-on-the-wall-2-with-the-same-name?article_related_ 
content=1 (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (on file with Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 147. See Winder, supra note 87, at 152 (explaining that the history and size 
of the craft brewing industry has led to a “unique culture where members 
collaborate with one another”).  
 148. Id.  
 149. See Martin Johnson, Collaborative Brewing is Heating Up in the Beer 
World, EATER (Jun. 5, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.eater.com/drinks/2015/6/5/ 
8734935/collaborative-brewing-is-heating-up-in-the-beer-world (last visited Feb. 
22, 2017) (“Retail buyers, bar managers, industry consultants and brewers all 
agree that cooperative brewing is a fast growing trend. Breweries working 
together to create a unique product ‘doesn’t happen on this level in any other 
alcoholic beverage’ category.”). 
 150. Winder, supra note 87, at 152. 
 151. See id. (“This culture of collaboration and the cultivation of local 
community support are key characteristics that have combined to create a close-
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The sense of camaraderie that the industry demonstrates in 
its brewing translates over to how breweries often approach 
potential trademark issues with other breweries.152 For example, 
when Molly Izo, Associate Marketing Manager for Deschutes 
Brewery, was asked how the brewery approaches potentially 
infringing trademark uses by other breweries, she responded:  
Typically we would contact counsel on such issues, but it’s not 
our policy to send out cease and desist letters. Because craft is 
what it is and represents the community it does, we typically 
try to reach out first to create common ground . . . We try to use 
the friendly approach because we never want to be the big bad 
guys saying ‘you need to stop using this right away.’153 
Molly Izo further explained that when Deschutes is contacted 
by other breweries about their own trademark use, though 
Deschutes has performed extensive searches of all their names, 
“there’s always the off-chance that there’s another brewery that’s 
been using the mark.”154 In these instances, Deschutes does its 
“best to try to work out some sort of coexistence agreement. It 
doesn’t always work that way, but it definitely does nine times out 
of ten.”155 The example of Deschute’s policies sheds light on the 
camaraderie of the craft brewing industry even when dealing with 
legal matters and demonstrates why entering into a trademark 
coexistence agreement is an attractive option for many craft 
brewers—an option that is threatened by the ruling in In re Bay 
State Brewing Company.  The remainder of this Note addresses 
the issue of what protections, if any, a trademark coexistence 
agreement provides to craft breweries in light of the recent (TTAB) 
ruling in In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc. 
                                                                                                     
knit industry with a strong sense of camaraderie.”).  
       152.  See Molly Izo, Deschutes Brewery: How the Craft Brew Boom is 
Changing the Industry’s Trademark Game, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (Sep. 15. 
2016), http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/Deschutes_Brewery_Interview 
_7116.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (explaining how Deschutes Brewery, which 
is located in Oregon, deals with trademark issues while “tak[ing] pride in the fact 
that the craft beer industry has typically been characterized by camaraderie and 
collaboration”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
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IV. Analysis of In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc. 
As discussed earlier , the TTAB issued a precedential decision 
on February 25, 2016 that denied applicant Bay State Brewing 
Company registration for the mark TIME TRAVELER 
BLONDE.156 The registration was refused “on the ground that 
Applicant’s mark, when used for Applicant’s goods, so resembles 
the previously registered mark TIME TRAVELER . . . for ‘beer, 
ale, and lager’ . . . as to be likely to cause confusion.”157 The refusal 
to register was made despite the fact that a consent agreement 
existed between the Bay State Brewing and the registrant of the 
existing TIME TRAVELER mark.158 In its decision, the TTAB 
states that it must consider the impact of the consent agreement 
in a likelihood of confusion analysis and summarizes that its 
determination for rejecting analysis “is based on an analysis of all 
of the facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on 
the likelihood of confusion.”159 
A. Description of du Pont Factors for Likelihood of Confusion 
Analysis 
The likelihood of consumer confusion is a question of fact.160 
When a court performs a likelihood of confusion analysis, it must 
consider each of the following factors if evidence has been 
introduced into the record (“du Pont factors”): (1) the similarity or 
dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties, (2) the similarity or 
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in the 
application or registration or in connection with which a prior 
mark is in use, (3) the similarity or dissimilarity of established, 
                                                                                                     
 156. See supra Part I. (explaining the background of In re Bay State 
Brewing).  
 157. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *1 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 158. See id. (“Applicant asserts that it has a consent agreement with 
Registrant, and asserts that ‘the parties acknowledge that confusion is likely 
unless they both adhere to the terms of the [agreement].’”). 
 159. Id. (citing In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 
1973)). 
 160. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 
1973) (explaining that there is “no litmus rule” in determining the likelihood of 
consumer confusion, instead, each case must be decided on its own facts). 
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likely-to-continue trade channels, (4) the conditions under which 
and buyers to whom sales are made, (5) the fame of the prior mark, 
(6) the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar 
goods, (7) the nature and extent of any actual confusion, (8) the 
length of time during and conditions under which there has been 
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion, (9) the variety 
of goods on which a mark is or is not used, (10) the market interface 
between applicant and owner of a prior mark, (11) the extent to 
which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark, 
(12) the extent of potential confusion, (13) any other established 
fact probative of the effect of use.161 The factors are not listed in an 
order of importance or merit and each may be used to play a 
dominant role in the likelihood of confusion analysis.162 
B. Likelihood of Confusion Analysis Applies to the Craft Brewing 
Industry as a Whole 
1. Similarity/Dissimilarity Between Applicant’s Goods and 
Registrant’s Goods (Second du Pont Factor) 
In In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc., the court first 
considered the second du Pont factor which is focused on the 
similarity between the Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods.163 In the 
TTAB’s brief analysis of the second du Pont factor, it concludes 
that the goods are identical because they are used for beer.164 The 
TTAB took notice that the registrations were for use on two 
different types of beer, with applicant’s mark to be used in 
connection with an “ale” style beer and the registrant’s mark used 
on “lager” style beers, however the TTAB concluded that because 
these are merely types of beer, the goods are still identical.165 With 
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 1361–62 (providing examples of past cases where various 
factors were used as the main determination in the likelihood of confusion 
analysis). 
 163. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *1 (T.T.A.B. 
2016) (explaining that the first factor that the TTAB considered was the second 
du Pont factor and an examination of the type of goods). 
 164. See id. (“The goods are identical insofar as the identification in the 
application and in the cited registration both include ‘beer.’”). 
 165. See id. (“The remaining goods in the cited registration, ‘ale’ and ‘lager’ 
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the TTAB’s approach that a beer is a beer, it is likely that in any 
analysis between two craft brewers, this factor will always weigh 
in favor of a likelihood of consumer confusion.166 
2. Trade Channels and Purchasers (Third du Pont Factor) 
After the TTAB concluded that the type of goods that the 
marks were to be used for were identical, the TTAB proceeded to 
analyze the third du Pont factor—concerning the similarity of 
established, likely-to-continue trade channels.167 The TTAB notes 
that there is an initial presumption that the trade channels and 
purchasers are the same if the goods identified in the application 
and the registration are at least in-part identical.168 It is important 
to note that if the TTAB continues to find that all beers are 
identical, it will likely be able to rely on such a presumption in any 
dispute regarding two beers.169 In In re Bay State Brewing 
Company, the TTAB defines the relevant trade channels as “liquor 
stores, beer sections of grocery and convenience stores, and the 
like, as well as bars and restaurants, and the customers would 
include ordinary consumers.”170 The TTAB also proclaims to “take 
judicial notice that beer is often relatively inexpensive, subject to 
impulse purchase, and often ordered orally in a bar or 
restaurant.”171 As a result, the TTAB finds that beer is held to a 
lesser standard of purchasing and thus, the third du Pont factor 
                                                                                                     
are otherwise closely related to, and in fact are types of beer.”). 
 166. See, e.g., In re Crow Hop Brewing Co., Ltd., 2016 WL 4775485 (T.T.A.B. 
2016) (providing an example of the TTAB using the Bay State Brewing likelihood 
for confusion analysis in another dispute between two breweries); In re Clipper 
City Brewing Co., 2017 WL 412405 (T.T.A.B. 2017) (same).  
 167. See id. at *2 (explaining that the TTAB’s analysis concerned the 
similarity of dissimilarity of trade channels for the applicant’s and registrant’s 
goods). 
 168. See In re Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(providing that even though there was no evidence regarding channels of trade 
and classes of consumers, the Board was entitled to rely on such a presumption 
in determining the likelihood of confusion). 
 169. See, e.g., In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 159 USPQ 721, 723 (C.C.P.A. 
1968) (demonstrating that where there are legally identical goods, the channels 
of trade and classes of purchasers are considered to be the same). 
 170. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *2 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 171. Id.  
136 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 103 (2017) 
weighs in favor of the TTAB finding a likelihood of consumer 
confusion.172 However, what the TTAB has failed to consider is that 
is that the average craft beer drinker is not simply the average 
beer drinker.173 Therefore, there is a potential argument that 
decisions regarding the purchase of craft beer are made by 
informed individuals, seeking a specific product, and as a result, 
these individuals would not be as likely to be confused.174 
3. Similarity Between the Marks (First du Pont Factor) 
The third aspect that the TTAB considered in its analysis was 
the first du Pont factor—“the similarity or dissimilarity of the 
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and 
impression.”175 The standard for comparing the similarity between 
two marks involves comparing “them in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression to 
determine the similarity or dissimilarity between them.”176 The 
purpose of the inquiry is to determine “whether the marks are 
sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such 
that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume 
a connection between the parties.”177 The TTAB builds on its 
analysis that because the goods are identical (essentially meaning 
that both products are beer), there is a lower standard needed to 
determine that the similarity of the marks points in favor of 
finding a likelihood of confusion.178 
                                                                                                     
 172. See id. at *2 (“When products are relatively low-priced and subject to 
impulse buying, the risk of likelihood of confusion is increased because purchasers 
of such products are held to a lesser standard of purchasing care.” (citing Recot 
Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000))). 
 173. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that craft beer 
resonates with a particular demographic, generally this demographic includes 
individuals who are college educated with well-paying jobs). 
 174. See Reid et al., Conference Paper, supra note 60, at 5 (characterizing 
craft beer as a “high order prestige good” that is “often viewed as highbrow” and 
describing the craft beer consumer as “sophisticated” and “discerning”).  
 175. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 
1973). 
 176. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *2 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at * 3 (“In comparing the marks, we are mindful that where, as here, 
the goods are identical, the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to 
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In its analysis, the TTAB notes that although marks are to be 
compared in their entireties, one portion of the mark may be given 
more or less weight in determining whether consumer confusion 
will occur.179 In particular, when comparing TIME TRAVELER 
BLONDE (applicant’s mark) and TIME TRAVELER (registrant’s 
mark), the TTAB finds that the term BLONDE in the applicants 
application is of a “highly descriptive or generic nature” as it 
simply describes the type of beer.180 Because of its descriptive 
nature, the TTAB concludes that BLONDE has no source-
indicating function and does “very little or nothing to distinguish” 
the applicant’s mark from the registrant’s.181 To further support 
its conclusion that the term BLONDE does not distinguish the two 
marks, the TTAB notes that it is common for consumers to shorten 
marks.182 This propensity to shorten marks is particularly relevant 
for goods such as beer because “[b]eer is often ordered by name, in 
a bar or restaurant, or from a menu, where only the name of the 
beer will be used (in this case, TIME TRAVELER).”183 Further, the 
TTAB does not consider how the term may affect the appearance 
of the mark on its label because many consumers who purchase 
these beers are “ordering these goods from a bartender or 
waiter/waitress will not have the opportunity to see a label when 
they order the product. Further, if the beer is served in a glass 
                                                                                                     
find likelihood of confusion need not be as great as where there is a recognizable 
disparity between the goods.”).  
 179. See id. at *3 (“Although marks must be considered in their entireties, it 
is settled that one feature of a mark may be more significant than another, and it 
is not improper to give more weight to this dominant feature in determining the 
commercial impression created by the mark.”); see also In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 
F.2d, 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]here is nothing improper in stating that, for 
rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a 
mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in 
their entireties. Indeed, this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.”). 
 180. See id. at n.5 (acknowledging that beers that are very pale in color are 
described as “blonde” and these beers “tend to be clear, crisp, and dry, with low-
to-medium bitterness and aroma from hops, and some sweetness from malt”).  
 181. See id. at *3 (comparing BLONDE to the descriptive term CAFE in In 
re Dixie Rests, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) where the court found that 
DELTA was the dominant potion of the mark THE DELTA CAFE).  
 182. See id. (“That is to say, when Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks are 
considered in their entireties, the term BLONDE does very little or nothing to 
distinguish them. In saying this, we also keep in mind the penchant of consumers 
to shorten marks.”). 
 183. Id. at *4. 
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because it is a draft beer . . . the consumer may never be able to see 
the label” and as a result will not be able to recognize the difference 
that the marks portray when used on their respective products.184  
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The two labels, which appear above in Figure IV.B.4185 appear 
markedly different, however, the TTAB presumes they are 
virtually identical in appearance “insofar as they both are 
standard character marks.”186 Furthermore, even when 
considering the full mark TIME TRAVELER BLONDE, the TTAB 
concluded that the mark was “virtually identical in sound” to the 
registrant’s TIME TRAVELER mark.187 Additionally, the TTAB 
found that both marks are arbitrary in relation to their respective 
goods, meaning that neither mark appears to be related to beer.188 
As a result of this arbitrariness, the TTAB concluded that there is 
nothing in the applicant’s mark that would suggest “or create a 
different commercial impression, when used on Applicant’s goods, 
as compared to Registrant’s goods.”189 Thus, the TTAB found that 
the similarity of the marks—the first du Pont factor—“weighs 
heavily in favor of a finding of a likelihood of confusion.”190 
4. Weighing du Pont Factors Against the Consent Agreement 
between Applicant and Registrant 
Overall, the TTAB’s likelihood of confusion analysis would 
apply to the craft brewing industry as a whole.191 The TTAB built 
its analysis on the cornerstone that the applicant’s and registrant’s 
goods were virtually identical—meaning that because both marks 
were to be used for beer, there was a lower threshold necessary in 
the likelihood of confusion analysis.192 In fact, TTAB concludes, 
                                                                                                     
 184. Id.  
 185. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *6 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 186. Id. at *4. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. (explaining that the two marks “would be even closer in meaning 
and overall commercial impression” given the arbitrary nature of TIME 
TRAVELER, as the two marks would be “used for the identical goods”). 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. 
 191. See e.g., In re Crow Hop Brewing Co., Ltd., 2016 WL 4775485 (T.T.A.B. 
2016) (providing an example of the TTAB using the Bay State Brewing likelihood 
for confusion analysis in another dispute between two breweries); In re Clipper 
City Brewing Co., 2017 WL 412405 (T.T.A.B. 2017) (same).  
 192. See, e.g., id. at *2 (“Because the goods identified in the application and 
the cited registration are at least in-part identical, we must presume that the 
channels of the trade and classes of purchasers are the same.”). 
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“[a]bsent other du Pont factors, the virtual identity in the marks, 
and the identity in the goods, trade channels, and purchasers, 
along with the impulse nature of purchases of beer, presents a 
compelling case for finding a likelihood of confusion.”193 The TTAB 
then proceeds to consider the impact that the trademark 
coexistence agreement in this case will have on the likelihood of 
confusion factors.194  
V. Examination of Specific Trademark Coexistence Agreement in 
In re Bay State Brewing Company, Inc. and the Implications for 
Future Coexistence Agreements in the Craft Brewing Industry 
This section discusses the TTAB review of the specific 
trademark coexistence agreement that was submitted with the 
application to register TIME TRAVELER BLONDE.195 As 
examined earlier in this Note, many judicial bodies, including the 
TTAB have reviewed coexistence agreements with great 
deference.196 In fact, the TTAB itself has viewed coexistence 
agreements as contracts has concerned itself with contractual 
issues, such an ambiguity and consideration.197 The analysis of In 
re Bay State Brewing Company appears to stray from the approach 
of the past as the Examiner and the TTAB view the agreement 
with a higher level of scrutiny—ultimately making the agreement 
useless in the current registration process.198 
                                                                                                     
 193. Id. at *4. 
 194. See id. at *4 (explaining that when there is a consent agreement 
between the applicant and the registrant in a case, the TTAB is to consider the 
agreement in light of balancing the likelihood of confusion factors).  
 195. See id. at *1 (discussing that the “existence of a coexistence agreement 
relates to one of the du Pont factors, namely the market interface between 
Applicant and Registrant” and that the TTAB must consider the impact of the 
agreement after considering the other factors). 
 196. See, e.g., Bongrain Int’l Corp. v. Delice De France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 
1484–85 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (providing an example of the Federal Circuit setting a 
very deferential standard to the parties involved in a trademark coexistence 
agreement when the court reviews such an agreement).  
 197. See, e.g., Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes, Inc., 2002 
WL 745591, *5 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (providing an example of the TTAB reviewing a 
trademark coexistence agreement under contractual standards).  
 198. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *10 (T.T.A.B. 
2016) (“Notwithstanding the consent agreement, we are persuaded that 
patrons . . . are likely to be confused as to source upon encountering the 
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In its opinion, the TTAB does, in fact, acknowledge the 
importance of consent agreements in the likelihood of confusion 
analysis.199 The TTAB further emphasizes that only “few [consent 
agreements] may be found lacking”—meaning that are few consent 
agreements that do not satisfy the standard to prevail in a 
likelihood of confusion analysis—but insists that there is no firm 
rule that consent agreements will always contravene refusal on 
grounds of confusion.200 The TTAB based its rationale largely on 
the fact that it reads In re Mastic Inc.201 to teach that there is “no 
per se rule that a consent, whatever its terms, will always tip the 
balance to finding no likelihood of confusion, and it therefore 
follows that the content of each agreement must be examined.”202 
It is important to note that this differs from the approach that the 
TTAB took in Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, a case decided 15 years after 
In re Mastic Inc., when it simply reviewed whether the agreement 
was unambiguous and contained consideration.203 Furthermore, 
while In re Mastic Inc. does provide an example where the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a TTAB order that denied applicant registration 
in light of a consent agreement—the case and consent agreement, 
are much different from In re Bay State Brewing. In In re Mastic 
Inc., the “consent [agreement] was a ‘naked’ consent without any 
restrictions or limitations on either the applicant or registrant 
with respect to marketing channels, purchasers, or users.”204 To 
support its conclusion, the Federal Circuit noted that the 
agreement submitted in In re Mastic Inc. “does not evidence a 
bilateral ‘agreement’” because the agreement is “simply a 
                                                                                                     
marks . . . even when these marks are used within the constraints set forth in the 
consent agreement.”). 
 199. See id. at *6 (citing to In re Wacker Neuson SE, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1048, 
1411–12 (T.T.A.B. 2010) to acknowledge that the TTAB is aware of precedence 
demonstrating the importance of consent agreements in the likelihood of 
confusion analysis). 
 200. See id. at *6 (explaining that it is “not a foregone conclusion” that all 
consent agreements will be “determinative” in establishing that there will not be 
a likelihood of confusion).  
 201. 829 F.2d 1114 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming TTAB refusal to register 
trademark “SHURLOCK” on the basis of likelihood of confusion). 
 202. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *6 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 203. See supra notes 130–140 and accompanying text.  
 204. In re Mastic Inc., 829 F.2d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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statement signed on behalf of [registrant].”205 Therefore, because 
the agreement did not demonstrate that the parties entered into a 
likelihood of confusion determination, the court did not grant it 
significant weight in its likelihood of confusion analysis.206 An 
analysis of the consent agreement submitted in In re Bay State 
Brewing Company will demonstrate that the consent agreement is 
much more thorough and contemplated than the one submitted in 
In re Mastic. 
A. The Consent Agreement Submitted in In re Bay State Brewing 
Company was a Long Form Agreement 
Initially, the applicant submitted a Short Form Agreement for 
review in the application of the mark TIME TRAVELER 
BLONDE.207 This short agreement was “intended to be made of 
public record with the Patent and Trademark Office” and due to 
the consequences of publishing documents in public record, did not 
contain all of the bargained upon terms.208 Upon denial of the short 
agreement, a Long Form Agreement, which was claimed to have 
been intended solely for the internal use of the parties, was 
submitted for examination.209 If a consent agreement is used to 
overcome a likelihood of confusion analysis, then it is necessary to 
become public record to provide public notice as to why the USPTO 
allowed registration.210 Therefore, from a practical standpoint, it is 
important to have an adequate agreement while not disclosing 
information intended to be confidential. 
                                                                                                     
 205. Id. at 1117.  
 206. See id. (“There are no undertakings of record between the parties which 
enter into the likelihood of confusion determination, and the board did not err in 
giving that [‘naked’] characterization to the consent.”).  
 207. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *6 (T.T.A.B. 
2016) (explaining how the record developed to include both a short form and a 
long from consent agreement).  
 208. See id. (discussing why two different forms of the consent agreement 
were drafted and provided to the USPTO). 
 209. See id. (“[T]he Long Form Agreement is a lengthier, more detailed 
agreement and it is appropriate that Applicant and the Examining Attorney have 
focused their attention on this agreement.”). 
 210. See id. at *4, n. 6 (describing that coexistence agreements take on extra 
significance if used to overcome a likelihood of confusion analysis).  
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Applicants, Bay State Brewing, argue that it and the 
registrant made “reasoned assessments of the marketplace” in the 
detailed, long form agreement.211 As a result of these assessments, 
the applicants believe that the agreement “is a non-naked, well-
reasoned and detailed agreement crafted by knowledgeable parties 
intimately familiar with the market and eager to avoid 
confusion.”212 The applicant’s argument followed that because the 
agreement was well reasoned by the two parties in the 
marketplace, that it should be “given the substantial and great 
weight as required by the Federal Circuit.”213 Despite the 
applicant’s arguments, the Examining Attorney reviewed the 
agreement in detail and found its pertinent terms 
“inaccurate . . . irrelevant . . . or legally insignificant.”214 In 
making his or her determination that the consent agreement was 
lacking, the examining attorney relied on In re Mastic Inc.215 The 
examining attorney also described and reviewed the relevant 
sections to the consent agreement—these sections will be 
discussed below. 
B. Specific Sections of Bay State Brewing’s Trademark Consent 
Agreement 
It is important to note that when considering the specific 
provisions of Bay State Brewing’s consent agreement, there are 
two overriding purposes for the parties entering into the 
agreement.216 First, the applicant and the registrant “‘wish to 
avoid any conflict with one another and consent to co-exist’ under 
                                                                                                     
 211. See id. (describing why applicants believe that the USPTO has not 
shown “good reason” to substitute its own determination for the likelihood of 
confusion with that of the parties involved).  
 212. Id. (explaining further that “the parties crafted an agreement designed 
to avoid confusion in the marketplace and underscored the agreement with a 
mutual commitment to collaborate in avoiding confusion in the marketplace”). 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at *5. 
 215. See id. (focusing on language in the case that indicates that there are 
instances where a consent agreement may not lead to overcoming the likelihood 
of confusion analysis). For a discussion of the case that the examining attorney 
relied upon, see supra notes 204–206 and accompanying text.  
 216. See id. at *6 (explaining the specifics of the consent agreement).  
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certain terms and conditions.”217 Second, the parties provide that 
they “agree to cooperate in good faith to resolve such actual 
confusion and to develop measures sufficient to avoid a likelihood 
of confusion.”218 The following sections are those that were deemed 
important by the TTAB. 
1.Restrictions on Use 
The Restrictions on Use section of the agreement provides that 
neither party will use its respective mark other than in connection 
with the respective house mark.219 Additionally, the applicant 
agreed that it will only use the entire mark, TIME TRAVELER 
BLONDE, or simply BLONDE—it will not use the words TIME 
TRAVELER (which is the registrant’s mark) in stand-alone 
fashion.220 Further, the applicant states that it will use the term 
BLONDE “in a manner that is equally as or more prominent than 
the terms TIME and TRAVELER.”221 The parties also agree that 
the applicant reserved the right to change the beer name to TIME 
TRAVELER MAIBOCK, but it would still comply with the 
stipulations agreed upon, simply substituting MAIBOCK for 
BLONDE.222 
In its analysis of this section of the agreement, the TTAB does 
not find it persuasive that the two parties agreed only to use their 
respective marks in connection with each house mark, as “the use 
of a house mark does not obviate confusion.”223 Additionally, the 
TTAB reads very deeply in the applicant reserving the right to 
change its name and concludes that this provision demonstrates 
                                                                                                     
 217. Id. 
 218. Id.  
 219. See id. (discussing that the registrant agreed that it would not use the 
mark other than in connection with its house mark (THE TRAVELER BEER CO.) 
and the applicant agreed not to use its mark other than in connection with its 
house mark (BAY STATE BREWING)). 
 220. See id. (addressing the applicant’s agreement on how it would use its 
mark in production, sales, distribution, marketing, and licensing).  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. (explaining the rights reserved by the applicant). 
 223. See id. (“We find, however, that the addition of house marks to these 
virtually identical marks used on identical goods does not necessarily mean that 
purchasers are not likely to be confused.”). 
THE TTAB SHOULD DRINK A BEER AND RELAX 145 
that BLONDE (which differentiates the applicant’s and 
registrant’s mark) is not an important aspect of the mark.224 
Therefore, even though the applicant is seeking to register its 
mark as a whole, and even though the two breweries agreed to use 
their marks in specific manners, the TTAB is assuming that the 
applicant “is relying on TIME TRAVELER as its source 
identifier.”225 Based on the precedential decisions explaining the 
significant weight to be owed to such agreements, it seems a 
stretch for the TTAB to read such assumptions into a private 
contract between the two involved parties.   
2. Geographical Limitations 
The Geographical Limitation provision of the agreement reads 
“Bay State [applicant] will not use TIME TRAVELER BLONDE 
outside of New England and the State of New York.”226 In the 
current case, the applicant is located in Massachusetts while the 
registrant is located in Vermont.227 The TTAB was troubled with 
the fact that the provision limited the applicant’s use to only New 
England and the State of New York, while the registrant’s use was 
not limited at all.228 The TTAB found this portion of the agreement 
caused two problems.229 
First, TTAB finds that even though the parties have provided 
some sort of geographical limitations, they have essentially agreed 
that “both marks will be used in overlapping areas,” namely New 
England and New York.230 The TTAB notes that the applicant is 
seeking nationwide registration, not a limited geographic 
                                                                                                     
 224. See id. at *8, n. 12 (questioning the fact that the applicant is willing to 
substitute one “highly descriptive or generic term” for another). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at *7.  
 227. See id. at *7 (explaining the TTAB’s trouble with the geographic 
limitations that are provided within the consent agreement).  
 228. See id. at *7 (analyzing the geographic limitations imposed on both 
parties via the agreed upon contract).  
 229. See id. (discussing the issues with this provision in the consent 
agreement). 
 230. See id. (explaining that the agreement allows the registrant to use its 
mark “within the entirety of the Applicant’s territory”).  
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concurrent registration.231 If Bay State had been applying for a 
concurrent registration, its registration would reflect a right to use 
the mark in a limited geographic area.232 In Holmes Oil Company, 
Inc. v. Myers Cruizers of Mena, Inc.,233 the TTAB articulated the 
difference between a consent agreement and concurrent 
registration: 
In contrast, if the parties enter into a consent agreement, rather 
than a concurrent use agreement, in order to overcome a refusal 
of registration on the ground of likelihood of confusion, such an 
agreement generally allows for each party's use in overlapping 
territories and does not result in geographic restrictions being 
placed on any party's registration, with the result being that 
each party obtains an unrestricted registration, subject to the 
parties’ consent agreement or contractual arrangement 
concerning use and registration.234 
The TTAB’s articulation of such a scenario gives deference to 
use restrictions as part of the contract negotiation process of a 
consent agreement and its willingness to register marks in 
overlapping areas with a consent agreement in place.235 
Nonetheless, in In re Bay State Brewing, the TTAB found it 
problematic that the consent agreement allowed for overlapping 
use.236  
Second, the TTAB is concerned that if the applicant was 
granted the nationwide registration that it sought, the registration 
would not reflect the geographic limitations that the parties 
voluntarily contracted for.237 Consequently, “although Applicant’s 
                                                                                                     
 231. See id. (“Here, Applicant is not seeking a concurrent use registration 
(with a corresponding geographical restriction in Registrant’s registration), but 
rather a nationwide registration.”). 
 232. See id. (discussing the ramifications of a concurrent use registration 
application and proceeding).  
 233. 2011 WL 6780741 (T.T.A.B. 2011). 
 234. Id. at *2. 
 235. See id. (explaining that “although this case is captioned as a concurrent 
use proceeding, it is only nominally one” as the parties have essentially entered 
into a “traditional consent agreement” with overlapping registration in the 
United States, minus Arkansas).  
 236. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *7 (T.T.A.B. 
2016) (“Here, the reality is that even as Applicant is bound by its agreement with 
Registrant, both marks will be used in overlapping geographical areas, namely 
New England and New York.”).  
 237. See id. at *8 (explaining that “the geographical restrictions set forth in 
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use, by the terms of the agreement, is limited to New England and 
New York, a nationwide registration issued to Applicant would 
give Applicant presumptive nationwide exclusive rights.”238 This 
would cause the issue that the national register would not 
accurately reflect the rights of the mark and thus would create 
problems with notice to the public and attorneys searching the 
register.239 Therefore, the TTAB determines that granting 
nationwide registration while the agreement limits the geographic 
scope of use, will be misleading and would undermine the 
important public notice function of the national register.240  
Although geographic restrictions were included in the consent 
agreement, the TTAB is so strongly displeased by the geographic 
restriction provision of the consent agreement that it states “in the 
absence of geographical restrictions, the effectiveness of the other 
provisions in this agreement is further diminished.”241 The TTAB 
is implying its own judgment to the consent agreement that the 
restrictions the parties have agreed upon are essentially 
meaningless. Such a view by the TTAB threatens the use of 
consent agreements within the craft brewing industry, especially 
considering how the industry is in large part geographically 
clustered.242  
3. Trade Dress 
The trade dress provision of the consent agreement between 
the two parties provides that neither party will use “trade dress in 
its packaging, labeling, and/or marketing” of their respective beer 
in a manner “that is confusingly similar to the labeling, packaging, 
marketing materials, or other images” used by the other party.243 
                                                                                                     
the consent agreement are not reflected in the application”).  
 238. Id. at *8. 
 239. See id. at *8 (“[W]hen marks are being searched and cleared, there is a 
presumption by searchers and attorneys afforded to an unrestricted registration 
that Applicant’s registration would not and should not be entitled to.”). 
 240. See id. at *8, n.11 (discussing the harm that would be caused to the 
registration system if both marks were on the register at the same time). 
 241. Id. at *8.  
 242. See discussion supra Part I.A.3. (explaining the geographical 
distribution of craft breweries). 
 243. Id. at *6.  
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The TTAB does not find this provision satisfactory as it believes 
the language only requires “each party not to use the trade dress 
of the other but do[es] not require the use of particular trade dress 
by either party.”244 The TTAB criticizes this section of the 
agreement because both marks are requesting registration for 
standard character marks. Standard character marks are not 
limited in presentation as they may be displayed in “any font, style, 
size, or color.”245 The TTAB therefore concludes that the parties 
could satisfy the trade dress agreement by displaying their marks 
in numerous fashions—however this would not aid in avoiding 
consumer confusion.246 Further, the TTAB places more weight on 
trademark law than contract law principles and considers the 
coexistence agreement as a representation of the applicant’s 
“desire [for] a decision based on the mark, not as applied for, but 
rather as promised” which would lead to further public notice 
issues. 247 The TTAB explains that this agreement simply 
represents a promise to use the mark in a certain manner (as the 
mark is not currently in use)—a promise that would deviate from 
the parameters of trademark application and registration and 
would ultimately undermine the public notice functions of the 
national trademark register.248 Ultimately, the TTAB decided that 
the trade dress provision of the agreement would not help prevent 
the likelihood of consumer confusion.249  
While acknowledging the TTAB’s argument in regards to 
public notice, one may consider that reviewing this consent 
agreement from a strictly contractual standpoint could potentially 
                                                                                                     
 244. Id. at *8. 
 245. Id. (citing In re Viterra, Inc., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1905, 1910 (Fed. Cir. 
2012)). 
 246. See id. at *8 (providing the example that the parties could use “minimal 
trade dress and smaller font displays of the house marks” and the “essence of the 
agreement would be met, but would not aid in the avoidance of confusion”). 
 247. Id.  
 248. See id. (“These promises as to trade dress and house mark usage 
represent another deviation from the parameters of the application and 
registration, and thus would result in a failure of the public notice function of the 
registration.”). 
 249. See id. (explaining that even after reviewing the trade dress provisions, 
the board is convinced a likelihood of confusion exists because of the use of 
“virtually identical marks on identical goods that are subject to impulse purchase 
by ordinary consumers in the same geographical area”). 
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help alleviate confusion in regards to the trade dress use. Doing so 
would place the burden on the parties involved in the action—
parties that are closer to consumers and have more incentive not 
to have their marks confused—to initiate a suit for breach of 
contract.250 The parties involved ultimately have more at stake 
than the TTAB in insuring that their respective marks are not 
used in a manner that is to be confused with the other.251  As a 
result, the parties would self-regulate to ensure that the trade 
dress used for each product did not cause public confusion. 
4. Trademark Applications 
The Trademark Application provision of the agreement 
provides that neither the applicant nor the registrant will take 
action to interfere with the other parties respective trademark 
applications given that each party complies with the terms of the 
contract.252 Furthermore, the parties agree to cooperate in 
executing any further documentation that the USPTO requires to 
validate the intent and the terms of the agreement in question.253 
In its opinion, the TTAB did not shed light on this specific 
provision, however, it should be noted that in the past, the TTAB 
has considered a similar provision as adequate consideration for a 
contract, and thus one of the factors making a consent agreement 
a valid contract.254 
                                                                                                     
 250. Cf. Ron Cauldwell Jewelry, Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes, Inc., 2002 WL 
745591, *5 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (explaining the parties’ unsuccessful complaint for a 
breach of contract).  
 251. See Amalgamated Bank of N.Y. v. Amalgamated Tr. & Sav. Bank, 842 
F.2d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that businessmen stand a lot to lose 
if their marks cause public confusion). 
 252. See id. at *7 (providing that aside from the registrant not taking any 
action against the applicant for the current trademark, the applicant agrees not 
to take action against the registrant for TIME TRAVELER or any current or 
future application that uses the word TRAVELER). 
 253. See id. (replicating the terms of the trademark consent agreement 
between the applicant and the registrant).  
 254. See, e.g., supra notes 138–140 (providing an example of a consent 
agreement being analyzed for consideration).  
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5. Likelihood of Confusion 
The Likelihood of Confusion provision of the consent 
agreement reads: 
The parties hereby acknowledge that they believe that there 
would not be a likelihood of confusion between the TIME 
TRAVELER mark and the TIME TRAVELER BLONDE mark 
if the parties comply with the terms of this Agreement. Should 
actual consumer confusion between the parties’ products occur 
in the future, however, the parties agree to cooperate in good 
faith to resolve such actual confusion and to develop measures 
sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion.255 
In light of the above provision, the TTAB found that the 
agreement is “sorely lacking in business information” that 
demonstrates why the parties believe that the trademarks will not 
cause consumer confusion if the terms of the agreement are 
followed.256 The TTAB provides examples of what it means by 
“business information” as it states “consent agreements often refer 
to differences between the goods, trade channels and classes of 
purchasers; the sophistication of purchasers; and dissimilar 
methods of advertising and promotion.”257 The TTAB criticizes the 
fact that the agreement is silent to such information, and takes the 
stance that similar information must be explicitly stated in the 
consent agreement and the TTAB is not in a position to infer the 
business information.258 In making this assertion, the TTAB cites 
Amalgamated Bank of New York v. Amalgamated Trust & Savings 
Bank259—a case where the Federal Circuit reversed a TTAB’s 
refusal to register a mark, even when there was a consent 
agreement between the two parties.260 In Amalgamated, the 
                                                                                                     
 255. In re Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., 2016 WL 1045677, *7 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 256. See id. at *8, n.13 (criticizing the agreement for its lack of business 
information based on the “particular circumstances of their contemporaneous 
use”). 
 257. Id.  
 258. See id. (“The agreement is silent on all of these points. Lest we be 
accused of knowing more about the beer business than Applicant and Registrant 
do, we are not in a position to infer business that is not specifically expressed in 
the agreement.”). 
 259. 842 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 260. See id. at 1271 (explaining the reversal of the TTAB’s decision to deny 
registration of the applicant’s service marks). 
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Federal Circuit scolded the TTAB for relying on its own views 
instead of the views expressed in the consent agreement by the 
affected parties.261 This case does not appear to be authority to 
support the TTAB’s position that all business information must be 
clearly in the consent agreement. Instead, Amalgamated reiterates 
the fact that substantial deference should be given to the parties 
coexistence agreements that are entered into two business 
parties.262 In fact, the Federal Circuit specifically recommended 
that the board should “heed[] the admonition of the CCPA in 
DuPont” that provides: “[d]ecisions of men who stand to lose if 
wrong are normally more reliable than those of examiners and 
judges. It can be safely taken as fundamental that reputable 
businessmen-users of valuable trademarks have no interest in 
causing public confusion.”263 Therefore, even the authority that the 
TTAB cited in its own decision, indicates that the TTAB seems to 
overstep it bounds in substituting its views for those of Bay State 
Brewing and the registrant. Instead, the TTAB should have 
followed Amalgamated, not substituted its own views, and 
“suppose[d] that [the parties] have to know the habits of their 
customers, and the application of such knowledge is implicit in the 
agreement here involved.”264 
VI. Conclusion 
The craft brewing industry is a growing and healthy industry 
in the United States. It is also a unique industry—one that has 
capitalized on the development of community support and 
established a collaborative, collegial atmosphere among fellow and 
competing brewers. The atmosphere amongst brewers often 
translates to how breweries interact with each other as they 
                                                                                                     
       261.   See id. at 1275 (“The TTAB’s reliance on its own views regarding the 
banking industry, rather than the views of the parties in question, contravenes 
the scope and intent of this court’s precedent in DuPont and Bongrain. In fact, 
the motions and agreement filed indicated the contrary to the board’s opinion.”). 
 262. See id. at 1273 (explaining that it is “difficult to maintain a subjective 
view that confusion will occur when those directly concerned say it won’t.” (citing 
In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1362–63 (C.C.P.A. 1973))). 
 263. Id. at 1275 (citing In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 
1363 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).  
 264. Id. at 1274.  
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approach potential legal conflicts. Combining the collegiality of the 
craft brewing industry with the fact that many breweries are 
startup businesses that are not able to fund litigation 
demonstrates the desire for many breweries to find means to avoid 
litigation. One way that craft brewers attempt to avoid litigation 
is to enter into trademark consent agreements—contracts that are 
contemplated by the parties to prevent a likelihood of confusion 
amongst consumers. 
It has been longstanding precedent in nearly every 
jurisdiction, including the Federal Circuit, and the TTAB, to give 
great deference to consent agreements and to not substitute the 
views of the judiciary for those of the parties whom enter into the 
agreement. Therefore, it has been well-established that if a 
consent agreement is well-reasoned and provides adequate 
restrictions on the mark or marks considered, then it will be given 
deference and both marks will likely be registered by the USPTO. 
However, in the case of In re Bay State Brewing Company, the 
TTAB steps away from the established and highly-deferential 
standard of review for consent agreements and prevents the 
registration of a mark in light of a detailed consent agreement. 
While the TTAB does make a respectable argument regarding the 
likelihood of confusion in the case, the divergence from the highly 
deferential review threatens the future use of trademark 
coexistence agreements in the craft brewing industry. Because the 
TTAB’s analysis largely depends on the fact that both of the marks 
are to be used for beer, it seems that the TTAB would reach the 
result that it did in In re Bay State Brewing Company in any 
dispute between two breweries. It appears that the only way a 
consent agreement between two craft breweries would appease the 
TTAB to allow registration would be in a case where the breweries 
were in markedly different geographic areas. With craft beer 
expanding at such a rapid pace and being distributed in a 
numerous markets, it brings into question if the TTAB’s desire for 
such “geographical distinctions” will ever be met by a consent 
agreement between two breweries.  
By any means, the TTAB’s decision in In re Bay State Brewing 
Company will significantly reduce the use of trademark consent 
agreements within the craft brewing industry. In an industry that 
is so reliant on maintaining a reputable brand and associated 
marks, the inability to enter into peaceful trademark consent 
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agreements will naturally lead to an increase in litigation. The 
increase in litigation will threaten the unique and collegial culture 
that the expansion of the craft brewing has fostered. Furthermore, 
the increase in litigation may hamper the development of many 
smaller breweries and prevent the craft brewing industry from 
expanding as it has recently. For the sake of the craft brewing 
industry, the TTAB should return to reviewing coexistence 
agreements as freely bargained for contracts and give them great 
deference. In doing so, the TTAB should heed the advice of the 
Federal Circuit and give “great weight” to consent agreements in 
a likelihood of confusion analysis because the parties involved “are 
in a much better position to know the real life situation than 
bureaucrats or judges.”265 
                                                                                                     
 265. Bongrain Int’l Corp. v. Delice De France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1484–85 
(Fed. Cir. 1987). 
